A game theoretical approach to construction safety in the repair, maintenance, alteration and addition (RMAA) sector by Hon, Carol & Chan, Albert
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted/accepted for pub-
lication in the following source:
Hon, Carol K.H. & Chan, Albert P.C. (2010) A game theoretical approach
to construction safety in the Repair, Maintenance, Alteration and Addition
(RMAA) sector. In Liu, Qian, Cathy, Ou, Yang, Yang, Qu, Minglu, Lulu, Sun,
Ke, Daniel, Tang, Liyaning, Maggie, Tao, Li, Lisa, et al. (Eds.) Proceed-
ings of the Second International Postgraduate Conference of Infrastructure
and Environment, Faculty of Construction and Land Use, The Hong Kong
Polytechnic University, Hong Kong, China, pp. 164-171.
This file was downloaded from: http://eprints.qut.edu.au/70583/
c© Copyright 2010 [please consult the author]
Notice: Changes introduced as a result of publishing processes such as
copy-editing and formatting may not be reflected in this document. For a
definitive version of this work, please refer to the published source:
  
 
 
 
A GAME THEORETICAL APPROACH TO CONSTRUCTION SAFETY IN THE 
REPAIR, MAINTENANCE, ALTERATION AND ADDITION (RMAA) SECTOR 
 
 
Carol K.H. Hon and Albert P.C. Chan 
Department of Building and Real Estate, 
The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, China. 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Safety has long been a problem in the construction industry. Repair, maintenance, alteration and addition 
(RMAA) sector has emerged to play an important role in the construction industry. It accounted for 53% of the 
total construction market in Hong Kong in 2007. Safety performance of the RMAA works has been alarming. 
Statistics indicate that the percentage of fatal industrial accidents arising from RMAA works in Hong Kong  
was over 56% in 2006 while the remaining 44% was from new works. Effective safety measures to address the 
safety problems and improve safety performance of the RMAA sector are urgently needed. Unsafe behaviour has 
been attributed to be one of the major causes of accidents. Traditional cost-benefit analysis of workers’ safety 
behaviour seems to be inadequate. This paper proposes to adopt a game theoretical approach to analyse safety 
behaviour of RMAA workers. Game theory is concerned with the decision-making process in situations where 
outcomes depend upon choices made by one or more players. A game theoretical model between contractor and 
worker has been proffered. Mathematical analysis of this game model has been done and implications of the 
analysis have been discussed. 
 
KEYWORDS 
 
Construction safety, RMAA sector, game theoretical model, safety behaviour.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Safety Performance of RMAA work  
 
Safety has been recognized as one of the problems besetting the Hong Kong construction industry. The Hong 
Kong Construction Industry Review Report (HKCIRC 2001) highlighted safety to be one of the six major areas 
for improvement. With shrinkage of the construction market and reduced volume of new works, repair, 
maintenance, minor alteration and addition (RMAA) works are playing an increasingly important role in the 
  
local construction industry. The proportion of RMAA works to total construction market has been doubled from 
24.7% in 1997 to 53.2% in 2007 (Census and Statistics Department HKSAR 2008a & 2008b). Although there 
has been noticeable safety performance improvement in the construction industry as a whole, this improvement 
does not apply to the RMAA sector. Percentage of accidents on RMAA worksites over the past ten years has 
increased from 17.9% of 1998 to 50.1% of 2007 whereas percentage of accidents on new capital works over the 
past ten years has decreased from 83.1% of 1998 to 50.9% of 2007 (Labour Department HKSAR 2008).  
 
Violation of safety rules has been attributed to be one of the major causes of accidents in the RMAA sector. An 
analysis of 90 fatality cases in RMAA sector between 1998 and 2008 identified ‘failure to wear safety belt/ 
harness’ to be the most frequently found unsafe action (Labour Department 2008). As explained by Zohar (2002), 
contrary to the assumption that self-preservation overrides other motives (Maslow 1970), people behave unsafely 
because safety measures are likely to entail modest apparent benefits but immediate costs, such as slower pace, 
extra effort or personal discomfort. If the likelihood of injury is underestimated in a seemingly safe environment, 
the expected utility of unsafe behaviour exceeds that of safe behaviour. Unsafe behaviour is reinforced as there is 
a tendency for people to place higher value to short-term results. In this sense, deterring unsafe behaviour is a 
great managerial challenge.  
 
RMAA sector largely involve small-medium-sized contractors which may not have adequate resources and 
awareness for safety. This sector employs a large number of unskillful labour who may not have sufficient safety 
training and safety awareness. As RMAA works are often undertaken in occupied buildings, the working 
environments do not resemble construction sites. RMAA workers may have the wrong illusion of being safe in 
the workplace and underestimate the risks involved. This sector is not subjected to the same stringent safety 
regulations as in new construction. To cite an example, a safety officer is required by legislation for a site with 
100 workers but it is rare for RMAA work project to comply with such size requirement (Chan et al. 2006). 
Rather than having a safety officer solely responsible for safety issues, RMAA project usually has a safety 
supervisor at the same time playing a dual role of site agent or project engineer.  
 
Existing Approach to Safety Behaviour  
 
Reason (1990: 145) defines violations as “deliberate […] deviations from those practices deemed necessary […] 
to maintain the safe operation of a potentially hazardous system”. Battmann and Klumb (1993) explain from a 
behavioural economics approach why people comply with safety regulations. People try to optimize their 
behaviour efficiency within the limits defined by internal and external constraints. From the perceptive of 
behavioural economics, rules and regulations act as natural or human made constraints of the substitutional 
transformation process, which limit the behavioural space of the individual. Rules which do not support 
individual’s attempts to optimize their actions are likely to be violated.  
 
Traditional rational-choice theory or decision theory is parametric, i.e. the probabilities of different outcomes are 
exogenous and not dependent on the decision chosen. It is assumed that a RMAA worker knows about the 
  
probability of inspection by contractor. The knowledge of probability may come from the workers’ experience. 
Conventional decision-theory predicts that a RMAA worker will choose to violate safety rules if the expected 
utility from violating safety rules is greater than the expected utility from not violating safety rules. 
 
Such analysis however, encounters the problem of Robinson Crusoe fallacy (Tesbelis 1989). The Robinson 
Crusoe fallacy is that one behaves as if the environment is not influenced by one’s own action, when in fact it 
consists of other rational actors whose actions are influenced by one’s own actions. Under the conventional 
decision-theory, safety behaviour decision of RMAA worker is made independently from the level of safety 
inspection. If the worker is representative, his estimate of the probability of safety inspection will be about the 
same as other workers’ estimates. Level of safety inspection is not fixed but chosen by a rational agent, the level 
of unsafe behaviour will influence the level of safety inspection. However, the rational choice theory approach 
has overlooked varying action of the other party.  
 
Game Theoretical Approach 
 
This paper argues that a game theoretical approach is considered to be a more realistic approach to analyse 
RMAA worker’s safety behaviour. Game theory takes into account of the dependency between two or more 
actors who jointly influence the outcomes and thereby each others’ payoff (Von Neumann and Morgenstern 
1944). That is, both parties can influence the outcome. A game theoretical model seems to be the proper way to 
model simultaneously the contractor’s decision to have safety inspection or not, contingent upon the worker’s 
combined choice; and the worker’s choice are also contingent upon the choice made by the contractor. The use 
of a game-theoretic model is the elaboration of argument put forward by various theories of behavioural 
adaptation. The crux of the argument in these theories is that workers are not passive receivers of safety 
measures. They are strategic actors who take advantage of whatever measure available to attain their goals. 
Theories of behavioural adaptation suggest that it is not appropriate to consider a person as a parametric entity. 
Despite this, theories of behavioural adaptation have not simultaneously considered the actions chosen by the 
contractor as response to the RMAA worker’s safety behaviour. In such case, application of the game-theoretic 
model to explain safety behaviour of two parties in interaction can be considered as an extension of line of 
thinking propounded in the theories of behavioural adaptation.  
 
GAME THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF RMAA WORKER’S AND CONTRACTOR’S SAFETY 
BEHAVIOR  
Game model of RMAA Worker and Contractor 
 
We introduce the game model of RMAA worker and contractor assuming all the players pursue rationally their 
own greatest effectiveness. We assume that the two optional strategies of workers are to comply with or to not 
comply with the safety rules. The two optional strategies of contractors are to enforce safety inspection or not to 
enforce safety inspection. We use a1 to denote the payoff of worker not complying with safety rules when 
contractor has safety inspection and a2 to denote the payoff of contractor with safety inspection when worker 
  
does not comply with safety rules. The payoff of worker not complying with safety rules when contractor does 
not have safety inspection will be represented by b1 and the payoff of contractor without safety inspection when 
worker does not comply with safety rules will be denoted by b2. For representing the payoff of worker 
complying with safety rules when contractor has safety inspection, we choose c1. For representing the payoff of 
contractor with safety inspection when worker complies with safety rules, we choose c2. We use d1 to denote the 
payoff of worker complying with safety rules when contractor does not have safety inspection, and d2 to denote 
the payoff of contractor does not have safety inspection when worker complies with safety rules. 
 
Following assumptions are made: 
 
A.1. RMAA worker prefers to perform unsafe behaviour if there is no safety inspection by contractor, i.e. b1> 
d1.  
A.2. RMAA worker prefers not to perform unsafe behaviour if there is safety inspection of contractor, i.e. c1> 
a1.  
A.3. Contractor will choose to play safety inspection visits if RMAA workers choose to not comply with safety 
rules, i.e. a2> b2.  
A.4. Contractor will choose not to play safety inspection visits if RMAA workers choose to comply with safety 
rules, i.e. d2> c2.  
 
Assumptions A.1 to A.4 imply that RMAA workers will act unsafely if there is no safety inspection. This, in turn, 
will lead to safety inspection, which will cause workers to follow safety rules. When worker follow safety rules, 
contractor will stop safety inspection, which again will cause workers to violate safety rules. These assumptions 
vividly reflect contractor’s actual safety practices in the RMAA sector. As most of the RMAA projects are small 
in scale, safety issues are often taken care of by safety supervisors. Unlike a safety officer who is designated 
fully to safety management of a project, a safety supervisor has to spare his time and effort to look after safety as 
well as day-to-day running of the project. As a rational actor, he will definitely allocate his time and effort to 
other issues if workers increase their level of safety compliance.  
 
The Normal Form of the game between RMAA worker and contractor is shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 Normal form of game between RMAA worker and contractor  
 Contractor 
Safety inspection No safety inspection 
RMAA Worker 
Not comply safety rules a1, a2 b1, b2 
Comply safety rules c1, c2 d1, d2 
 
Analysis of the Game between RMAA Worker and Contractor 
 
  
According to the assumptions A.1 to A.4, there is no equilibrium point under pure strategies of game theory. An 
equilibrium point is an outcome where none of the players can improve his outcome by unilaterally changing his 
choice. Thus an equilibrium point is generally a stable outcome. In the discussion above, either the worker or the 
contractor is motivated to alter his choice, and the situation is highly unstable.  
 
On the other hand, there exists a unique equilibrium point in such a game if both parties adopt a mixed strategy 
according to standard game theory. A mixed strategy is simply to choose one of the pure strategies with 
probability p, and the other one with probability 1 - p. At the equilibrium point, each of the parties can achieve a 
so-called security level by the use of a mixed strategy. 
 
In this example, we use q* to denote the probability that the contractor chooses to have safety inspection and 1 - 
q* to denote the probability that the contractor chooses not to have safety inspection at the equilibrium point 
where RMAA worker is not able to reach a payoff above value V no matter what he does. We use r* to denote the 
probability that the RMAA worker chooses not to comply with the safety rules and 1 - r* to denote the 
probability that the RMAA worker chooses to comply with the safety rules at the equilibrium point. According to 
game theory, the best way to maximize one’s expected utility (EU) in a non-cooperative game with antagonistic 
preferences and no pure strategy equilibrium, is to choose this specific mixed strategy at the mixed strategy 
equilibrium point. We call this specific mixed strategy the equilibrium strategy in the following. 
 
For the contractor, the equilibrium strategy consists of selecting to inspect or not inspect in such a circumstance 
that the RMAA worker’s expected utility of complying with safety rules will equal to the expected utility of not 
complying with safety rules. This can be calculated as follows: 
 
    * *1 1EU(not comply) 1q a q b                           (1) 
    * *1 1EU(comply) 1q c q d                              (2) 
EU(not comply) EU(comply)  when: 
                       * * * *1 1 1 11 1q a q b q c q d      (3) 
Solving Eq. 3 for q* yields: 
   
 
   
* 1 1
1 1 1 1
b d
q
b d c a
                                    (4) 
 
By choosing ‘inspection’ with probability q* and ‘not inspect’ with probability 1-q*, the contractor can limit the 
worker’s expected utility maximally to V. V can be calculated by substituting Eq. 4 in either Eq. 1 or Eq. 2: 
 
  
 
 
   
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
b c a d
V
b d c a
                (5) 
 
The RMAA worker’s equilibrium strategy, i.e. which level of safety compliance that will make the contractor 
indifferent between “to inspect” and “not inspect”, can be calculated in a similar way as the above, that is we 
examine when contractor’s expected utility of inspecting equals the expected utility of not inspecting. 
     * *2 2EU(inspect) 1r a r c            (6) 
     * *2 2EU(not inspect) 1r b r d          (7) 
EU(inspect) EU(not inspect)  when: 
         * * * *2 2 2 21 1r a r c r b r d                        (8) 
Solving Eq. 8 for r* yields: 
 
 
   
* 2 2
2 2 2 2
d c
r
d c a b
               (9) 
 
Just as the contractor can make RMAA worker indifferent between complying with and not complying with the 
safety rules, the RMAA worker can make the contractor indifferent between inspecting and not inspecting. Now, 
the only stable equilibrium point in this game emerges when both parties play their equilibrium strategies with q* 
and r*. 
 
The implication of the game theoretical analysis  
 
This model has a number of implications to safety of RMAA works.  
 
Short-term effect of safety inspection 
 
Safety inspection of contractor can only bring about temporary safety improvement to RMAA works. Following 
from the last assumption, if the contractor enforces more safety inspection than equilibrium strategy, workers 
will tend to reduce their violation of safety rules. The contractor, however, will then reduce his effort of safety 
inspection back to the equilibrium. Not before long, worker will increase the level of unsafe behaviour in light of 
the reduced safety inspection. In this way, safety inspection is only effective in the short-term but not in the 
long-term. Safety inspection alone cannot bring about reduction of accident rate to zero because the equilibrium 
point r* (violating probability) is always greater than zero. Thus, persistently unwavering safety inspection is 
needed to effectively combat violation of safety rules.  
 
Size of penalty has no effect on worker’s safety behaviour  
 
  
Changing the size of the penalty will not affect safety behaviour of RMAA workers. Increasing the penalty only 
changes the equilibrium strategy of the contractor but not the equilibrium of the RMAA worker. If penalty of not 
complying with safety rules increases, payoff of RMAA worker subjected to contractor’s safety inspection a1 
decreases. Contractor will reduce the level of safety inspection to the new equilibrium strategy. However, the 
equilibrium strategy will be the same for worker and therefore, no change in worker’s safety behaviour. By this 
rationale, increasing the level of penalty severity (e.g. from fine to restraint from working for certain days) will 
not effectively change the worker’s level of safety compliance.  
   
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 
To conclude, this paper has attempted to analyse safety behaviour of RMAA worker and contractor from a 
game-theoretical approach. A game model between RMAA worker and contractor has been formulated and 
mathematical analysis has been done. The game model demonstrates its value by coming up with sensible 
intuitions and it vividly reflects real safety practices of RMAA sector by taking into account of social 
interactions of two players. Implications to safety strategy of RMAA sector have also been discussed. There are 
limitations in this paper which await further research. A simplified two-player game-theoretical model has been 
formulated. Findings and implications of the model has yet been verified with real world examples. In the future, 
research could be done on more complicated remodelling of the game and empirical verification of the model by 
case studies.  
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